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Business researchers, executives and regulators may assume that state ownership in 
firms raises risk for private co-investors. After all, private investors are seeking 
profits while states are seeking welfare. Giving them both equity only confuses the 
aims of an investment project, complicates the job of investment project managers 
and raises the overall risk of investment project failure. But these assumptions do not 
fit the evidence as demonstrated by a well-known risk indicator observable in 
hundreds of investment projects located in dozens of countries: in countries where 
initial investment terms are more vulnerable to renegotiation by host country 
governments, we found that “minority rules” apply whereby a non-controlling, but 
still substantial equity investment by a host country government can play a risk-
mitigating role.   
 
One of the oldest political risks facing foreign (and domestic) private investors is that 
initial, often quite favorable, terms for long-term investment projects in mining, 
manufacturing and power generation industries can be unilaterally upended by host 
country governments. A government official may decide that initial terms setting low 
tax rates on project profits were too generous, or that local hiring targets were too low. 
In demanding renegotiation, host country governments have an advantage. Private 
investors often have substantial plant, property and equipment vulnerable to hold-up, 
maybe even outright expropriation, if demands are not met.  
 
In response, private investors should consider enlisting the host country government as 
a minority co-investor, but only where the broader risk of an investment policy change 
is substantial. Our contingent recommendation follows from analysis of more than 900 
project finance-based foreign direct investment (“project”) deals announced in 53 
countries from 1990-2006. These were typically not previously state-owned enterprises 
undergoing privatization; rather, they were more likely new, greenfield projects like 
Acciona’s wind farm project in Mexico, dubbed the 2012 Deal of the Year by Project 
Finance Magazine, or Enron’s Dabhol power project disaster in India during the 1990s. 
In the Acciona and Enron examples and others, project capital structure provides a 
window on project risk. Where there was more equity as a percentage of overall capital 
funding a project, we inferred more project risk in the near term. That is because project 
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creditors, large commercial banks such as Barclays, Citibank and the Bank of Tokyo, 
usually lend less to projects more vulnerable to near-term failure.   
 
In the projects we reviewed, equity as a percentage of overall capital tended to increase 
for projects announced in countries given to sudden policy changes. Increasing project 
risk with increasing policy instability was interesting. Perhaps more interesting was the 
contingent risk-mitigating role of state ownership we observed. Project equity as a 
percentage of overall capital and, thus, project risk decreased in countries with low 
policy stability, but only when the government entity held a minority (less than 50%) 
equity stake. Project equity percentages and risk went back up when there was no 
government equity stake or when government held a majority (greater than 50%) equity 
stake. The risk-decreasing effect of minority equity holding by the government was 
greatest when the equity stake was in the 21-30% range. 
 
State ownership in projects sends at least two signals to private investors. One signal is 
assurance that original policy terms will not be reversed lest the state share in losses 
from the policy reversal. Another signal relates to possible state interference in the 
project to achieve broader welfare-oriented goals, such as decreasing unemployment. In 
countries where policy reversal is more likely, minority co-investment by the state 
sends private investors this mix of signals: a strong signal assuring private investors that 
original deal terms will be upheld; but also a weak signal of state interference under 
those original deal terms. The overall signal is favorable and decreases project risk. 
 
What about projects located in countries with substantial policy stability? There, initial 
project terms are less likely to change significantly over a project’s life.  In this context, 
state equity stakes only add to overall project risk even at relatively low (less than 5%) 
equity levels. Here, a stronger signal of assurance is redundant. Stable policies provide 
the same assurance to private investors. All that is left is a stronger signal of state 
interference in project management under the original terms. The overall signal is 
unfavorable and increases project risk.  
 
Figure 1. Relationship between investment risk and the percentage of state ownership 
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Take-aways from our study include the following: 1) countries given to sudden policy 
shifts impose greater risks for investors leading projects located there; 2) in these 
sudden-change countries, a host country government equity stake in a project may 
decrease overall project risk by giving the state a reason not to demand a renegotiation; 
3) the risk-mitigating effects of state ownership are contingent on limiting the state to a 
substantial but still minority stake in a project with a “sweet spot” of somewhere from 
21-30% of overall project equity; and 4) giving states majority equity stakes in less 
stable (often developing) countries may prompt them to maintain original investment 
terms, but still prompt some threat of interference with project management under those 
original terms. Our minority rules can help mitigate project risk, but they cannot make 
it disappear altogether. 
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